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The recent debate over the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
regimes of international arbitration has resulted in concerted efforts 
aimed mainly at protecting the rights of states to regulate, improving 
transparency of proceedings and eliminating inconsistency in 
decision making of the tribunals. While the existing scholarly work 
frequently addresses issues of the relationship between the existing 
investment regimes and good governance in general, increased 
attention is rarely paid to the effects that investment arbitration 
has on democratic practice. The article applies an “action-based” 
approach to democracy, in order to analyse the role that the ISDS 
regimes play in exacerbating conflicts between the local populations, 
foreign investors and governments. The analysis leads to a conclusion 
that the ISDS regimes create incentives for the governments and 
foreign investors to disregard sound democratic practice. The article 
represents an attempt to move the discussion about the ISDS regimes 
away from the question of legitimacy of the regimes to the question 
of the impacts that the regimes have in practice.
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Introduction
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is a mechanism 
of international arbitration that enables foreign investors 
to sue host countries in front of an international tribunal in 
cases where an international investment agreement has been 
breached. The rationalization for these regimes is based on 
the following two assumptions: (1) the neoliberal theory of 
development, which states that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is the main driver of development; and (2) the so-called “home 
bias” hypothesis, which claims that the domestic court systems 
will disproportionately favour the home governments against 
foreign investors. The ISDS regimes are a logical consequence of 
these two assumptions. The home bias of the courts is eliminated 
by allowing the foreign investors to bring claims against states 
in front of an international tribunal and the foreign investment 
is stimulated by eliminating the fear of arbitrary expropriation.
This system of investment arbitration has recently come under 
challenge. In the last decade, we have seen a growing amount 
of scholarly work focusing on investor-state dispute settlement. 
This surge of interest in regimes of international investment 
arbitration has been a result of several high-profile cases1 and 
explicit concerns of some countries related to the issues of 
sovereignty, transparency, and inconsistency (Brocková 2016) 
of the tribunal decisions. In the case of some countries2, these 
concerns have led as far as withdrawing from the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
terminating or renegotiating many of their investment 
agreements. While most other countries (and trading blocs) 
have not gone as far, they have nonetheless revaluated their 
positions towards investment arbitration in the last decade, 
typically leading to efforts at modernizing their stock of 
investment treaties by adopting a new generation of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). This emerging debate focused on the 
reform of the ISDS regimes and bolstering their legitimacy has 
concentrated mainly on the relationship between the states 
and the investors, sometimes ignoring the impact that the ISDS 
regimes can have on democratic practice. 
1 Such as Occidental v. Ecuador, Vattenfall v. Germany, Metalclad v. Mexico, or the so-called 
“Argentinian cases” like CMS v. Argentina and Enron v. Argentina.    
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This article will be using Cotula ś (2017) framework for analysing 
interactions between the regimes of investment arbitration and 
democratic practice. This theoretical framework differentiates 
between the “rules-based” and “action-based” approach to 
democracy. The “rules-based” approach is mostly concerned 
with democratic institutions. It is focused on representative 
organs and democratic procedures within institutions and 
their functioning. This approach sees any action taken by 
a representative organ within a given legal framework as 
democratic (Cotula 2017: 355-358). The second approach is 
broader and involves an element of popular pressure and local 
democracy. Democratic practice in this framework involves a 
pattern of conflict and compromise between the government 
and the local populations of the country. This approach to 
democracy is sometimes called “action-based” and focuses 
more on practice (Cotula 2017: 355-358). The existing scholarly 
literature can be most often placed within the framework of the 
“rules-based” approach. I, however, will be analysing the effects 
of investment arbitration on democratic practice within the 
“action-based” framework.
The approach of the article towards the subject is utilitarian, 
in the sense that I will not be looking at whether the ISDS 
regimes are democratic in themselves, but rather trying to 
establish whether some of the results it produces conform to 
democratic theory. The approach represents an attempt to move 
the ISDS discussion away from the complicated debate over the 
legitimacy of the regimes, towards an analysis of their real-life 
impact. The goal of the article is to show that the current system 
of ISDS contributes to the defects in democratic practice, while at 
the same time presents an opportunity to address these defects.
In order to accomplish the goal stated in the previous paragraph, 
I will first review the existing scholarly literature concerned 
explicitly or implicitly with the issue of democracy, in relation 
to the ISDS regimes within the “rules-based” approach. In the 
second part of the article, I will apply the “action-based” approach 
to democracy to several mining conflicts in Colombia, which 
resulted in investment arbitration, in order to demonstrate the 
role of investment arbitration in democratic practice. This part 
will show two ways, in which investment arbitration has an 
influence on democratic practice. Firstly, it lacks incentives for 
the investor to conduct their activity in line with the interests 
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state to regulate foreign investment in line with the interests 
of local populations. Within the “action-based” approach to 
democracy, terms “defects in democratic practice” or “negative 
impact on democratic practice” are to be understood as any 
outcomes that do not conform to the expressed positions of 
the local populations, or situations where the local populations 
are shut out from the decision-making process in matters that 
directly concern them.
Review of invesment arbitration research dealing with 
democracy
In this part of the article, I will take a closer look at how 
the issue of democracy is being dealt with in the existing 
academic and policy-oriented texts focused on the ISDS regimes. 
Dominant framework that informs most of the research into 
ISDS regimes sees states and the investors as the main actors. 
These two actors come into conflict on the level of investment 
arbitration in cases where the actions of the nation-states in 
regulating their investment environment are perceived by a 
foreign investor to be outside the scope of the powers accorded 
to states by international investment agreements. 
This dominant framework of understanding centred on the 
dichotomy of states and investors is generally expressed in 
statements such as: “whereas some sing its praises as a method 
of protecting private property interests against improper 
government interference, others decry investment treaty 
arbitration (ITA) as biased against states” (Franck 2014: 12). 
When it comes to policy-oriented texts, this framework can 
be made visible in UNCTAD ś 2017 World Investment Report, 
which identifies “Promoting and Facilitating Investment” and 
“Safeguarding the Right to Regulate while Providing Protection” 
as two of the main areas of the IIA Reform effort (UNCTAD 
2017: 126). On the level of states, a joint declaration of Bolivia, 
Venezuela and Nicaragua on the occasion of announcement 
of plans to withdraw from the ICSID Convention stated: “(We) 
emphatically reject the legal, media and diplomatic pressure 
of some multinationals that ... resist the sovereign rulings of 
countries, making threats and initiating suits in international 
arbitration” (quoted in Anderson: 2007).
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on the ISDS regimes does not lend itself to explicit analysis 
of the relationship between ISDS and democracy within the 
action-based framework. Most of the scholarly work on the 
topic is therefore done within the rules-based approach, which 
focuses on democratic institutions and their interaction 
with the regimes of investment arbitration. The concept that 
is central for these authors is the concept of the “right to 
regulate”, as evidenced by its prominent place in academic 
research and policy-oriented texts. It is related to the issue of 
internal democratic deficit of the ISDS regimes, in so far as the 
states in question can be viewed as democratic. The research 
of the ISDS and the right of states to regulate is focused on 
the question of whether the ISDS regimes enable investors to 
block government regulatory measures. The right to regulate 
has been extensively addressed both in the academic texts 
(Henckels 2017, Korzun 2016, Giannakopoulos 2017) and policy-
oriented texts (UNCTAD 2016, 2017). The research has led to a 
conclusion there the protection of the state’s “right to regulate” 
needs to be made explicit in the IIAs, especially in areas such 
as environmental and consumer protection. This has led to 
tangible results in recent years, with the IIA treaties of the new 
generation3 typically including explicit mentions of the “right 
to regulate” in public interest.
Within the framework of the right to regulate, the existing 
scholarly litereature is also concerned with the so-called 
“regulatory chill” phenomenon, which can also be seen in 
terms of the effects of investment arbitration on democratic 
practice. Regulatory chill represents an extension of the “right 
to regulate” concept. However, it is no longer concerned with 
the comparatively simple issue of ability of the state to regulate 
its investment environment, but rather with its willingness to 
regulate its investment environment in public interest. The 
question is not whether ISDS enables the investors to prevent 
government regulation through legal means, but whether the 
investors are able to use the threat of litigation to block such 
regulation. This represents an issue of democracy to the extent 
that the governments are democratically elected and, therefore, 
represent the population to a certain degree. Any negative 
impact that the ISDS regimes have on the willingness of the 
government to regulate can be seen as a negative impact on 
democratic practice.
3 See for example the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, China-









XXV (84) 2019, 
36-52
The most widely used definition of the regulatory chill is the 
one put forward by Tietjem and Baetens in their study of the 
impact of ISDS in TTIP for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Netherlands. They define regulatory chill as a situation in which 
“a state actor will fail to enact or enforce bona fide regulatory 
measures because of a perceived or actual threat of investment 
arbitration” (Tietjem, Baetens 2014: 68). Furthermore, they 
distinguish between (1) not drafting particular legislation 
in anticipation of arbitration, (2) chilling legislation upon 
awareness of arbitration risks, and (3) chilling legislation 
after the outcome of a specific dispute (Tietjem, Baetens 2014: 
68). In other words, the ISDS can work as a deterrent against 
government regulation, including in the case of legitimate 
public interest measures.
Although the regulatory chill hypothesis is internally 
consistent and intellectually appealing, it is problematic on 
scientific grounds. The sciences simply don´t have reliable 
methodology to prove causes for absence of a phenomenon. 
The only way to confirm the hypothesis is to make careful and 
detailed case studies (Gros 2003). The conditions that need to be 
met for the hypothesis to be valid are: (1) the governments and 
the relevant government officials dealing with regulation need 
to be sufficiently aware of and familiar with the ISDS regimes 
and their implications; and (2) the governments and the 
relevant government officials need to take these considerations 
into account when regulating. Further research on this topic is 
undoubtedly necessary, but rests outside the scope of this paper.
There is one more element of democratic deficit of the ISDS 
regimes that the existent research addresses, namely the 
issue of transparency of the ISDS proceedings. The issue 
of transparency relates to democracy in the context of 
public oversight of the government policies. On the level of 
academic scholarship, it is widely recognized in the arena 
of international investment policy-making. UNCTAD cites 
transparency among the main issues of the ISDS regimes in all 
its major publications (UNCTAD 2016, 2017). The EU has already 
introduced full mandatory transparency of the arbitration 
process within the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) and is expected to push for the same in the 
case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) (EU 2015). Some progress has also been made on the level 
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Arbitration Rules have been amended to improve transparency 
of the proceedings among other things (Wong, Yackee 2010: 259-
260). However, many cases remain subject to confidentiality, 
especially in cases of discontinued proceedings, where the 
transparency is subject to agreement of the parties. Both the 
governments and the investors often have good reasons to 
keep the details of the ISDS cases confidential. It is illustrative 
in this regard that when UNCTAD publishes the yearly World 
Investment Report, they always report the number of known 
cases (UNCTAD 2017:125) (italics mine).
This brief review of research concerned with the relationship 
between the ISDS and democracy shows that the existing 
literature deals in significant detail mainly with the “right to 
regulate” of democratic states applying a rules-based approach 
to democracy. In comparison, there has been less attention paid 
by the scholars to the effects that the ISDS regimes have on local 
democracy within the action-based approach to democracy. 
The following chapters aim expand the discussion on the 
relationship between ISDS and democracy to focus more on the 
aspect of local democracy.
ISDS regimes as a problem: local democracy
In this chapter, I will be analysing the ISDS regimes within 
the “action-based” approach to democracy. I will be therefore 
interested in how do the ISDS regimes affect the ability of 
population to influence the conduct of foreign investors and 
their governments. Between 2016-2018, Colombia has been 
subject of five new cases of ISDS having been filed by foreign 
mining companies against its government. What all five cases 
have in common is a strong element of local democracy at 
the beginning of the conflict that led to the foreign investor 
opting for ISDS arbitration. In the following paragraphs, I will 
use these cases to create a pattern of conflict that leads to ISDS 
cases. This pattern shows two ways in which the ISDS regimes 
create barriers for local populations to control their investment 
environment: (1) it creates a disincentive for the government 
to accede to demands of the local populations; and (2) it creates 
an insurance for the investors for activities that the local 
populations often view negatively. What we want to achieve 
with these cases is to highlight the interplay between local 
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arbitration. The paradox of the ISDS cases that will be presented 
here is that these are cases where the democratic practice is 
observed and the local populations manage to at least partly 
push through their demands. However, these cases highlight 
that observance of democratic practice results in punishing 
ISDS cases and the ability of investors to file these cases on 
an international level works as a partial disincentive for the 
investor to seek local support.
While there is existing research into the way the ISDS regimes 
affect processes on the level of the government in the case of 
the regulatory chill, there has been considerably less interest 
in what impact the ISDS regimes have on the way that the 
local democracy functions. We will demonstrate that the ISDS 
regimes create a rift between the interests of local populations 
and their governments in cases where the local populations 
come into conflict with foreign investors.  
The five recent cases we will be looking at here are: (1) Cosigo 
Resources gold mine in Colombia4; (2) Glencore coal mine in 
Colombia5; (3) Eco Oro gold and silver mining concession in 
Páramos6; (4) Galway Gold operation in Páramos7; and (5) Red 
Eagle mine in Páramos8. These cases were filed between 2016-
2018, and are currently pending.This is not problematic for this 
article, since we are not concerned with the results of these 
cases, rather with the interaction of the ability of investors 
to file these cases under current regimes and conditions, in 
particular the local democracy.
In 2001, Colombia implemented the Mining Code, which opened 
the door for foreign investors to develop massive mining 
projects in Colombia. This has brought a large amount of 
investment into Colombia, but also created an unprecedented 
amount of socio-environmental conf licts connected to 
activities of the mining companies. These conflicts are most 
often caused by the concerns of indigenous populations over 
the environmental impact of mining. In the subsequent years, 
these local populations have created a pressure on local and 
state authorities to stop mining in many regions of the country, 
4 See Cosigo Resources and others v. Colombia, 2016. UNCITRAL.
5 See Glencore International and C.I. Prodeco v. Colombia, 2016. ICSID Case No. ARB/16/6.
6 See Eco Oro v. Colombia, 2016. ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41.
7 See Galway Gold Inc. v. Republic of Colombia, 2018. ICSID Case No. ARB/18/13.
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going as far as organizing local referenda9 against the mining 
projects10. In several cases, this pressure has resulted in halting 
of mining projects, either through local municipal decisions, or 
environmental legislation from the state. This has resulted in 
an increasing number of ISDS cases being filed against Colombia 
in relation to mining regulation. In some regions, the situation 
is more complicated. In Segovia for example, the local economy 
is based on traditional mining, which is disrupted by big 
mining companies. The opposition to foreign miners in these 
regions is based not on environmental, but more on economic 
and social grounds. These conflicts have been exarcebated by 
the government ś ban on traditional mining, which has resulted 
in strikes and violence in affected regions. However, I will not 
be attempting a holistic analysis of the mining conflicts, I will 
merely be constructing a base for creating a pattern, which 
will enable me to make relevant observations on the role of 
investment arbitration in these conflicts.
Since the early 2000s, the Canadian mining corporation Cosigo 
Resources has been prospecting the area of Yaigojé in the south 
eastern part of Colombia for mining potential. The company 
has also mounted a public relations campaign in order to 
gain the support of the local population for their mining 
activities. However, most of the local communities, associated 
on the ACIYA (Association of Indigenous Leaders of Yaigojé 
Apaporis) are against mining in the rainforest area, mostly on 
environmental grounds (Castro 2013). They managed to convince 
the Colombian government to declare the region a national 
park, which makes mining prohibited. The national park was 
established on 27th October 2009. However, two days later, the 
national geological authority issued a gold mining license for 
Cosigo. In 2011, the General Prosecutor’s Office demanded that 
the mining concessions for the national park be annulled and 
in 2013, the National Mining Agency declared Cosigo’s mining 
license to be expired and the mining concessions suspended. 
The miners then filed for injunction against the establishment 
of the national park area at the Constitutional Court, but the 
court ruled against the injunction in 2015 (Corte Constitucional 
2015). This prompted Cosigo to file an ISDS case against the 
government based on the US-Colombia Trade Promotion 
9 For example in relation to „La Colosa“ mining project in Cajamarca.
10 These popular consultations have been restricted as a means to stop extractive projects 
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Agreement11. The argument of Cosigo is that the annulment 
of mining concessions amounts to indirect expropriation on 
the part of the Colombian government and thus constitutes 
a breach of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. 
The award sought by Cosigo is 1,6 billion dollars mostly as 
compensation for future profits.12 Without considering the legal 
merits of the case here, the filing of the ISDS case demonstrates 
how the environmentally motivated actions of the Colombian 
government, petitioned by local communities on sustainable 
development grounds, clashes with the investment activities 
of the foreign investors, leading to an ISDS case.
The second case is related to activities of the Glencore 
conglomerate in the coal mining industry in Colombia. 
The coal mining has been a major source of pollution in the 
Cesar region of Colombia for the last twenty years, having 
severe environmental impacts, most notably leading to 
forced resettlement of Boquerón, Plan Bonito, and El Hatillo 
communities in 2010 (Tan, Faundez 2017: 67). The Boqueron 
community has since been vocal in their opposition to coal 
mining in Cesar. (Torres et al. 2015). This particular case relates 
to the expansion of a mine in Calenturias owned by Prodeco, a 
subsidiary of Glencore. Although the expansion was authorised 
in 2016, on the back of the public opposition, the government 
sought to revoke parts of the concession for the mine in 
question, which led to Glencore filing for ISDS arbitration for 
an alleged breach of the Colombia-Switzerland BIT13. The claims 
arise out of the government’s alleged unlawful interference 
with the coal concession contract.14
The last three cases are all related to mining activities of 
multinational mining companies in the Santander region in 
the protected area known as Páramo. The miners were able 
to secure a controversial exemption to mine silver and gold 
in parts of the Santurban Páramo during the 1990s. Since the 
beginning of the projects, a coalition of grassroots activists 
and local communities has been campaigning against mining 
in the Páramo on environmental grounds (Rodríguez-Salah 
11 Colombia-US Trade Promotion Agreement, Col.-US, 2006. ratified in 2012, avialable at 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text.
12 For details, see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/726
13 Agreement Between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Col.-Sw., 2006. ratified in 2009.
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2018). The main concerns were related to water pollution and 
biodiversity. On the back of the popular opposition to mining 
in the previously protected areas, the Ministry of Environment 
and Sustainable Development adopted a resolution delineating 
the Santurban páramo as an area of special protection in 2014 
(Ministerio de Ambiente 2014). In 2016, the Constitutional court 
definitively declared as illegal the mining activities in the 
Páramo of Colombia (Corte Constitucional 2016). The reaction of 
Eco Oro was to file a case with the ICSID in Washington. Eco Oro is 
claiming 764 million dollars in damages, and the main charges 
are once again related to indirect expropriation of the mining 
concession as a result of the decision of the constitutional court, 
with the aim of recuperating the losses and potential future 
profits. The case was filed under the Canada-Colombia FTA1516. 
Galway Gold and Red Eagle, also Canadian miners, followed suit 
in 2018 with the same claims. 
While the role of investment arbitration is not the main driver 
of the dynamics of these socio-environmental conflicts, these 
cases offer a good illustration of the relationship between 
investment arbitration and local democracy. By analysing these 
cases, it becomes clear that the relationship between investment 
arbitration and local democracy is conflictual. Based on these 
three cases, the following pattern of environmental conflict 
related to a mining related activity takes place (1) economic 
activity of a foreign investor is initiated; (2) the local communities 
perceive the activity as damaging on environmental ground 
consistent with sustainable development paradigm; (3) the local 
communities organize in order to achieve goals that are generally 
consistent with sustainable development; (4) the government 
bows to the popular pressure and enacts measures that limit or 
stop the investment activity; and (5) the transnational company 
sues the government for breach of the ISDS regime. Other cases 
(not limited to mining related conflicts in Colombia) that follow 
the same pattern, but are outside the scope of this article include 
Occidental v. Ecuador17, Metalclad v. Mexico18, Dominion Minerals v. 
Panama19, Glencore v. Bolivia20, and other.
15 For details, see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/756
16 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia, Can.-Col., 2008. 
ratified in 2011.
17 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. 
Republic of Ecuador, 2006. (II) ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11.
18 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, 1997. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
19 Dominion Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Panama, 2016. ICSID Case No. ARB/16/13.
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The role of the ISDS regimes with regard to local democracy that 
these cases highlight is twofold: (1) they represent a potential 
punishment for governments when they put interests of the 
local populations ahead of the interests of the investors; and 
(2) they represent an insurance policy for the investors in cases 
where their interests are opposed by the local populations. 
The obvious paradox here is that in the analysed cases, local 
democracy was unltimately not hindered, since the local 
population was able to push through their demands. However, 
the pattern developed in the previous paragraph shows that the 
role that investment arbitration puts the arbitration regime in 
direct opposition to processes of direct democracy, effectively 
punishing the state for observing sound democratic practice. 
Moreover, the arbitration is a burde for the states irrespective 
of the result of the arbitration, with the costs of arbitration and 
legal representation rising steadily in the past decade.
It is important to stress that the ISDS regimes are not necessarily 
the main forces in environmental and social conflicts related to 
foreign investment. Indeed, the responsibility to assure that the 
investors conduct their activity in a way that is not opposed by 
the local populations rests on the shoulders of the government, 
who draft the investment contracts. Although the contracts 
usually include provisions requiring the investor to publish 
a sustainable development report and acquire local support for 
the project, this process is usually flawed, as shown by the 2017 
report on the operations of Glencore in Latin America,21 and as 
evidenced in the cases analysed previously. At the same time, 
the current architecture of the ISDS regimes is demonstrably 
conductive to the conflicts described in this chapter. While 
investment arbitration is clearly not the main factor in 
decision-making of the main actors, the role of investment 
arbitration as a threat to the government against acceding to 
demands of local populations opposed to investment activities 
and as an insurance for the investors is clear.
ISDS regimes as a solution: corporate responsibility standards
The last part of this chapter will be dedicated to an analysis 
of ways to mitigate these negative effects of the ISDS regimes in 
relation to local democracy. In other words, the question that 
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the next paragraphs will focus on is: how can the ISDS regimes 
change from being a part of the problem, to being a part of the 
solution?
The cases analysed in the previous chapter show that the base 
of the problem rests in the unwillingness or inability of the 
governments of democratic countries to bring the conduct 
of foreign investors in line with the interests of the local 
populations and the legal framework does not offer strong 
enough incentives for the investors to conduct their operations 
in concert with local populations. This is facilitated by the ISDS 
regimes through punishing the states when acting against the 
interests of investors and providing a way for the investors to 
seek compensation when they clash with the local populations. 
However, at the same time as being a part of the problem in 
the context of local democracy conflict, the ISDS also presents 
a potential platform for mitigating the local conflicts described 
in this and the previous chapter. 
The way that the ISDS regimes can contribute to mitigating 
local conflicts between populations and investors is through 
a reform of the investment treaties that provide a basis for 
ISDS. More specifically, the reform effort needs to implement 
the concept of responsible investment. This concept actually 
represents one of the pillars of the UNCTAD ś IIA reform plan 
(UNCTAD 2017: 126), although it is not developed in detail. The 
concept of responsible investment is also central to the UNASUR 
efforts in establishing a new ISDS regimes for the Latin America 
with a permanent court (Patino 2017). The concept of responsible 
investment consists of incorporating into the IIAs a number of 
provisions and conditions that the investor needs to meet to 
have access to ISDS. These conditions would generally relate to 
sustainable development and democratic participation, since 
these often represent a basis for the local conflicts that these 
measures seek to mitigate. These provisions have the advantage 
of being a part of an international treaty and therefore would 
take precedence over the government contracts in terms of 
access to ISDS. 
The problem that the concept of the responsible investment 
faces is the question of whether the structure of international 
investment regimes allows for the incorporating of such 
measures, while at same time retaining or increasing the levels 
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could be established on the level of the BITs, because of the 
prevailing narrative of neoliberal development and the need 
to create as favourable conditions for the investors as possible, 
which creates a competitive framework that can often result 
in governments compromising on the level of regulation in an 
attempt to attract foreign investment. 
However, this competitive framework is largely absent in 
multilateral negotiations. Since these treaties often include 
all regional players, the government do not face the problem of 
losing out on investment to their neighbours by applying the 
admittedly strict concept of corporate responsibility. Therefore, 
regional and supra-regional free trade agreements represent a 
platform where the concept of responsible investment can be 
successfully developed. Indeed, some regional treaties, such as 
the Intra-MERCOSUR Cooperation and Facilitation Investment 
Protocol22 already contain the so-called ‘corporate responsibility’ 
provision, which tasks foreign investors with conforming 
their investment activities with standards of sustainable 
development. This ought to bring the activities of investors more 
in line with interests of local populations by creating an added 
incentive for the investors to pay attention to the issues of local 
democracy and, therefore, limit the number of local conflicts 
which can result in ISDS litigation, as shown before.
We can therefore conclude that the best way to mitigate the 
negative effects of ISDS regimes on local democracy described 
previously is to incorporate the concept of responsible 
investment into multilateral investment treaties.
Conclusion
Recent decade has seen a large amount of work focused on 
legitimacy of the ISDS regimes. Comparatively, a significantly 
smaller portion of academic texts have been dedicated to the 
question of the impact that the ISDS regimes have on democratic 
practice outside the legal ramifications of the system.
Analysis of this impact within the “action-based” approach to 
democracy shows that cases of socio-environmental conflict, 
which can trigger investment arbitration proceedings, follow 
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a uniform pattern. This pattern shows that ISDS regimes can 
contribute to defect in democratic practice. This manifests itself 
in the form of an incentive for the executive power to disregard 
popular pressures, and a disincentive for the investors to 
consider the interests of local populations. 
The analysis also shows that the possibilities to mitigate the 
effects of ISDS regimes on the willingness of the governments 
to regulate in public interest in the face of a potential 
litigation are limited. However, when it comes to limiting 
the negative impacts of the ISDS regimes on the ability of the 
local populations to push through their interests in relation 
to conduct of foreign investors, the concept of responsible 
investment applied to multilateral investment treaties offers 
the best opportunity.
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